137th French Infantry to the left of the 9th Brigade, on the north, the 6th Division was now the left flank element of the XXXIII French Corps, on the boundary line between the French Seventh and Eighth Armies. 21

The 60th, 61st, 11th, and 6th Infantry entered the line in that order from north to south. As in the Anould sector, this sector was also held by two serial combat groups, and as before, the division was in a quiet rest sector, where there had been no serious activity since the German advance down the Yaye valley to St. Die in 1914. Contained at that point, the enemy had been forced back to the line Semois-La Petite Fosse-Frapelle and there he had remained. At this time the German units opposite the 6th Division were the 31st Division and the 38th Bavarian Reserve Division of Army Group Duke Albrect. 22

Composed for the most part of men 38 to 45 years old, these enemy divisions were no more anxious to start serious hostilities than the permanent French Territorials in the sector. On the slightest alarm, said a current French summary of intelligence, the enemy withdrew as far as his third line of defense. In the month prior to the arrival of the 6th Division, in addition to normal patrolling, two raids had been made by the French, on La Costel late in June and on Frapelle on 12 July, the latter confirming that most of the civilian populations had been evacuated from that town and also from

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21 FO 16, 5th Div, 6400 p.m., 13 Jul.

22 The 31st Div was without permanent elements. At this time it consisted, from north to south, of five attached Landstrum battalions and the 60th and 10th Landwehr Regts (Official Hist, p. 346; Historie of 31st Div of the German Army, Washington, 1920), pp. 746-747.
Basilay. Over the month, enemy fire had averaged 500 rounds per day across the 25-kilometer front, including two gas bombardments of French artillery positions, at La Cense de Chaplis and southeast of Moyenmoutier, each with approximately 250 gas shells.23

Three days after the arrival of the 5th Division, the enemy forces learned of the presence of Americans on that front when during a patrol on the morning of 21 July a lieutenant left his gas mask with full identification inside the German lines.24 During the same patrol, prisoners were taken that identified the 60th and 10th Landwehr Regiments, 310th Division, and information that the 1st Bavarian Erste Regiment, 39th Bavarian Reserve Division, was at Fregelle.25

From the French OPs on the heights in the St. Die sector, on Montagne d’Ormont and the heights near the Plaine valley, observation was possible for miles in all directions. Little that went on in the enemy lines or behind them in the villages along the Alsation border went unobserved. The 5th Division summaries of intelligence are filled with details of the village and farm activities carried on daily just beyond the enemy network of wire and trenches.

23 2nd Pr Div, Fortnightly SOI, St. Die sector, 28 Jun - 13 Jul. Reprod by 9 - 2, 5th Div (5th Div Box 5, 22.21).
24 Opn Memo 5, 5th Div, 27 Jul (5th Div Box 9, 32.14); prisoner interr, stoch to SOI 34, 5th Div, 1 Aug (6th Div Box 4, 20.1).
25 SOI 28, 0-24 hrs, 22 Jul (5th Div Box 4, 20.1). SOI 55, 18 Aug., was to report the 1st and 5th Bav Eras Regts in the line, the 2nd Bav Eras Regt in reserve. The 1st Bav had 100-man companies (38 - 45 years old) with a steinbrugg (light detachment) of one NCO and two young men in each company. A sturmkommando was said to be in training in the rear. Fm de Sur Basilay was reported to be the boundary between the 39th Bav Eras Div and the 301st Div.
On a typical day in early August, for example, 300 women and children were observed picking potatoes or other vegetables in the fields north of Menil and carrying them into Senones. (The evacuation of Menil had been in progress for several days.) In the roads and fields between Saulx and Provencelles, 184 men were seen working — at what, the observer did not say — and 86 civilians were counted in the streets of La Petite Fosse.

Sometime that day, a body of at least 140 enemy soldiers were seen marching along the road from Saulx to Valistine. (Requests by the 5th Division to shell such targets were regularly denied by its French advisors.) In the afternoon, observers saw 50 women and children on the road out of Senones, going towards Camp Bretternstadt, and 55 men with 22 horses and 12 wagons were counted on the roads in the vicinity of Vexaincourt. North of that village, 20 horses could be seen pastured in a field. Occasionally, groups of German soldiers were also seen picking vegetables near one farm or another.

That same day, an unusually active one for the enemy artillery, 366 rounds of HE and 44 shots from enemy trench mortars were fired into the 6th Division sector. The artillery of the 5th Division replied with 152 rounds. (The 5th FA Brigade arrived from La Valaissone that day, joining the 43 French batteries on the division front.) In addition, there was the usual rifle fire, occasional bursts of machine gun fire, exchange of hand and rifle grenades, as well as trench mortar and antiaircraft activity. The casualties in the division as a result of all this gun fire were

22 28 27, 5th Div, 11:00 p.m., 28 Jul. 29, 4:00 p.m., 8 Aug, put all arty in the St. Die sector under the 5th FA Brig comm as of 8 Aug.
one man wounded and another killed, both in the 60th Infantry -- but whether by shell fire or small arms, the report did not say. 27

During the period 4 – 16 August, just prior to the assault on Frapelle, 5th Division 0 – 3 reported total enemy fire of 1,885 rounds of HE in the sector. On the other hand, 5 – 2 estimated that 2,662 rounds, 44 trench mortar shells, and 230 minenwerfer shells, for a total of 2,966 HE rounds, had fallen in the sector. (Over the same period, 8th Division guns fired 2,341 rounds.) In those twelve days, 5 officers and men were reported killed and 71 wounded, virtually all of the casualties resulting not from shell fire but from rifle and machine gun fire while on patrol. 28

There were no gas attacks in the sector until 15 August, when the division reported approximately 150 gas shells on battery positions in the vicinity of Le Chapais, and 30 HE and 20 gas shells, "probably phosgene and mustard," over a 4-hour period on Chapelle St. Clair. The Division Gas Officer made no report on the shelling of the battery position, and in his first report of the gas at Chapelle St. Clair apparently accepted the regiment's word that there had been no casualties. 29

27 SOI 41, 4 Aug; DOR, 6th Div, 0–24 hrs, 4 Aug (6th Div Box 12, 35.1).

28 SOI 41 – 53, 4 – 16 Aug; DOR 4 – 16 Aug. Between 28 Jul – 12 Aug, the 60th Inf in SS Ravines (for Sub-Sectors, see Map No. 4) made over 60 patrols, the 61st Inf in SS Rabodeau made more than 12 patrols, the 41st Inf in SS Ban de Sap made over 60, and the 6th Inf in SS Ormonde made 30 or more -- a total of over 170 recon, combat, and ambush patrols (Semi-Monthly Rpt. 6 – 5, 5th Div 6th Div Box 12, 35).

29 SOI 52, 15 Aug; Rpt on Gas Atk, 16 Aug (6th Div Box 20, 63.33); Rpt, CO 6th Inf to 0 – 2 5th Div, 15 Aug, sub: Enemy shelling our trenches (6th Div Box 20, 33.7).
Visiting the 6th Infantry at Chapelle on the 16th, however, Fisher, the Division Gas Officer (recently made captain), learned that 22 casualties had developed among the 380 men of Companies B and C, 6th Infantry, when 40 (not 20) rounds of 105-mm. yellow cross fell on their hillside positions just before midnight on the 15th (Map No. 6). Ten of the men, asleep in dugouts, became casualties when vaporizing mustard gas penetrated their quarters the next morning. Of the 22 casualties, 8 were evacuated with lung complications, 4 with burns, and 17 as eye cases, a number of the latter also beginning to develop symptoms of lung complications.

Decontamination was begun at 1130 and completed at 1400 at which time it was decided to evacuate all the troops in the immediate area. "The Boche," said Captain Fisher, "evidently expected an attack and used gas to harass the troops. The unusual delay in notifying all gas officers was the reason for delay in evacuating the troops and decontaminating the areas."

The Attack on Frespelle

Nine kilometers east of St. Die was Frespelle, a village in the enemy lines on the north edge of the Fave valley. In the long uneven front slanting down through the Vosges, the village of Frespelle and Hill 461 to its north were part of a noticeable salient in the French line. The salient, it was said, afforded the enemy a possible jumping-off point.

30 Taylor, Fisher to CCS, 16 Aug (GAF-5th Div) reported 15 casualties; corrected in Bpt on gas Attk, 17 Aug (5th Div Box 20, 63.35). DOR, 16 Aug, reported 12 men in the 6th Inf. and 3 officers and 5 men in the signal and MG units gassed at Chapelle St. Clair.

- 21 -
for an offensive up the valley towards St. Die.

There is evidence that the attack on Frapelle was initiated by the 5th Division, even though its official history says that the division was directed by XXXIII Corps, pursuant to instructions from General de Boissoudy, Seventh French Army, to capture the village and hill and close the valley to the enemy.31

The preparations for the attack must have been difficult to conceal from the Germans. Of approximately 62 French and American batteries in the sector, commanded by Brigadier General Flagler, 54 were concentrated opposite Frapelle on the night of 14 - 15 August and placed under the direction of Col. Brooks Payne, commander of the South Groupment, for the artillery preparation. For the main attack, the artillery comprised 8 batteries of field guns, 5 batteries of mountain guns, 4 batteries of heavy mortars, 7 batteries of heavy longs, and 7 batteries of trench artillery. For the diversion on Hill 607, on the sector boundary southeast of Frapelle, there were 2 batteries of heavy artillery and a battery of trench mortars.32

At 0354 on 17 August, all guns opened fire. The preparatory fire on the assault objectives lasted for just six minutes, from 0354 to 0400. The

31 Brief Hist, p. 7; Official Hist, p. 70. The 5th Div did not issue a field order for this opn, nor has an order for it been found in the Ordres Generales, Ordres Particuliers, or Notes de Service of XXXIII Corps for this period (French Files Box 104). MS Hist of 5th PA Brig (5th Div Box 29, 11:4) suggests that the opn was agreed to by XXXIII Corps.

"I think it highly probable...the green Americans...spoiling for action and anxious to distinguish themselves...initiated the Frapelle attack." Pers Itr, Brig Gen Hugh W. Rowan, ret. (DOO, stoch 5th Div, 22 - 31 Aug 1918) 26 Jan 1928.

32 For the diversion, see Bty of 5th TM Bty...on Hill 607 (5th Div Box 30, 33:9).

- 23 -
accompanying fire continued on enemy installations beyond the town and hill until 0430. While the mountain and heavy long guns put neutralization fire on designated enemy trenches, batteries, and machine gun emplacements all during the fire mission, the field guns and trench mortars raked the defenses of Frapelle and Hill 461 and out pathways through the wire before the town. From H minus 6 to H plus 4 minutes, batteries of 75's fired over a thousand gas shells on machine gun emplacements in the Bois Carré, after which the heavy short artillery poured destructive fire on the wood. For all but the last five minutes, two 75-mm batteries put smoke shells on the enemy OP's commanding the valley. A total of 192 shrapnel, 3,572 HE, 1,086 gas, and 882 smoke shells were put down on Frapelle and its defenses.

At 0400, as the near artillery fire lifted and the 13th MB Battalion laid a barrage on the exits and streets of Frapelle, Companies L and M of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry, climbed out of their trenches and advanced on the town. Behind them, Companies I and K moved into the vacated trenches, and Companies A and C came up as support. According to the division history, at 0406 the enemy, "evidently prepared for the attack," put down a counterbarrage on the departure trenches that caught the second, third, and fourth waves as they advanced.

33

Opns 0-2, 8th Div, 14 Aug, Plan for Employment of the Arty Opn (8th Div Box 30, 22, 12); Col Brooks Payne, 20th FA, Rpt of Opn Cond, Light and Mountain Artillery... (20th FA Rpt IA 1944); Hist of the 8th FA Brig (8th Div Box 29, 11-4).
Ahead of this counterbarrage, Company L took Frapelle and Company M, overcoming machine gun fire from its slope, occupied Hill 481. The operation was over by 0445 (Map No. 7).34

This minor action seems to have required justification. The capture of Frapelle, the division history was to say, represented "the only indo-
tention suffered by the Germans in their southern sector in three years of trench warfare." Elsewhere, the New York Times is reported to have said in a postwar article that the taking of Frapelle, where the entire German garrison was captured or destroyed, did not receive the notice it deserved. When informed of the article, Lt. Col. Herbet Parsons, division G - 2, demurred. Referring to the matter of the garrison, he said: "The garri-
son consisted of four, in two groups of two each. One was killed. The body of the other was not found. The other two were captured, one half-
witched.35

It was, nevertheless, a successful tactical operation, and German, French, and American communications acknowledged as much at the time.36 The

34 Brief Hist, p. 8; ltr, Lt Col E. M. Norton, CO 6th Inf to CO 10th Brig, 18 Aug, subj: Frapelle Operation (6th Div Box 20, 35.0).
35 Ltr, Parsons, former G - 2, 5th Div to Actg G - 2, 5th Div, 11 Feb 19, subj: Material for History on G - 2 of 5th Div (5th Div Box 6, 21.1). Col Parsons was one of the two proofreaders of the Official History, and this history, by a circumlocution, reports the garrison of four.
36 A Seventh French Army bulletin spoke of it as "a brilliant action." VII Ar mee, Bulletin de Renseignements No. 1347, 18 Aug (5th Div Box 20, 33.0).
casualties sustained in taking the town and hill, as reported in Pershing's communiqué on the 18th, were 8 officers wounded and 2 gassed, 14 men killed, 70 wounded, and 15 gassed -- principally, it must be presumed, as the result of HE fire during the attack and gas and HE fire later in the day. Keeping the town was to prove far more costly.

Air Bursts

The artillery before Frapelle was silent from 0430 to 1020 on 17 August while the infantry began consolidation of the town. It would appear that some of the enemy guns may have been put out of action, and that those still capable had expended their immediate ammunition in the counterbarrage, for the hostile artillery was also silent that morning. At 1020, a single battery in Colonel Payne's South Groupment was ordered to put gas shells on previously shelled German OP's north of Beulay, and rafale and CPO fire were ordered at 1100 and 1130 on enemy troops coming down the road from Beulay.

Meanwhile the enemy artillery had recovered itself or replenished its supply. Shortly after 1000, several batteries opened with destructive fire on Nœvillers. About 1400 the first gas shells were reported falling in Frapelle. By 1610 both light and heavy enemy guns were shelling the

[Communique (5th Div Box 2, 11:4).]

Rafale fire was a sudden burst of several rounds of rapid fire from each of the guns of a battery. CPO (contre preparation offensive) fire was intense fire put down in the zone just beyond the limits of bayrags fire. See Opns IX 418, 87th Ft Div Arty, 25 Aug, sub: Contre preparation offensive (French Files Box 154).
town with HE and gas. Sporadic barrages of HE appear to have continued through the evening of the 17th. Payne’s South Groupment made no reply until 2000, when all guns of the groupment laid down a barrage in front of Frapelle.

Soon after the barrage fire began, the artillery was notified that the infantry in Frapelle planned to advance under the fire and take the Bois Carré, "since the enemy appeared to be shelling it under the impression that it was occupied." The barrage fire was at once advanced. Then at 2045 the 10th Brigade signalled abandonment of the plan. Whether the heavy enemy fire on Frapelle made the attack too hazardous, or whether enemy troops, seen returning to the wood late that day, halted the advance of the 6th Infantry is not clear.

Without distinguishing between gas and HE shells, 8th Division 0–2 reported that the enemy had fired 2,500 shells on the day of the attack in and around Frapelle.

On the early morning of 18 August, the gassing of Frapelle was resumed in earnest. Situated in a valley with hills to the northwest and southeast, the town nestled against a rock cliff facing the enemy. His

39 Rpt, Payne, Opns against Frapelle, 19 Aug (6th Div Box 30, 33-6).
40 Payne, Rpt of Opnt Comdr...Opns...during the atk upon Frapelle.
41 SOI 54, 17 Aug. As a result of some confusion in the opns section, evident in the dating of its reports, no BDR’s seem to have been issued for 16 and 17 Aug. No check is possible, therefore, on the count of enemy shells on the 17th.
yellow cross shells, fired into the face of the cliff, produced in effect air bursts of mustard gas over the town. The steady crashing of mustard gas shells against this cliff and the lobbing of HE into the town began at 0110 and continued until after 0745. In midmorning and again in the late afternoon, Frapelle and Graignoulette were subjected to short intense HE bombardments.

Evacuation of gas casualties in Frapelle had just begun that night when, apparently, following heavy shelling of Frapelle and Graignoulette shortly after 2100, the enemy made his expected counterattack. The divisional artillery, upon rocket signal, put down barrages in front of Frapelle at 2125 and 2230, to contain the enemy, as the rifle and machine gun fire of the infantry drove the enemy back into the Bois Carré. One of the few field messages found for this period, an artillery signal, seems to refer to this counterattack: "Enemy artillery too active. Infantry badly handicapped, losing heavily. Infantry demand and need support of our artillery. Just received report that enemy coming in large force." Appended was a last-minute note: "Clark [Major, battalion commander, 20th FA]...is about to open up with gas 600 yards in front of our line." The only confirmation

42 Interview with Brig Gen Hugh W Rowan, ret. (200, atchd, 5th Div, 22 – 31 Aug 44), 19 Nov 47.

43 Col Payne, Est of GFM Comdr...Frapelle Ope, 22 Aug. No confirmation of this atk appears in the 801’s or DOR’s, and the history does not make clear just when the counterattack occurred on the 18th. DOR, 20 Aug, fpte active reconnaissance in front of Frapelle and an atk at 2346 hrs on the 18th against Hill 461, repelled by a heavy barrage.

44 FM, Ltr Lt Burkhardt 20th FA to Col Payne CO 20th FA, n.d. (5th Div Box 31, 32,46).
of this gassing is the operations item "1020 PM, 18 June. Zone 19 gassed," assuming Zone 19 designated a target above Frapelle. There is evidence, however, that there was a further bombardment of Frapelle with gas and HE at 2220, following the failure of the counterattack.

Altogether, 2 - 3 reported, the enemy fired 1,490 shells that day, all but 90 into the Frapelle area. Gas and HE shells were not distinguished.

Late on the 18th, the division reported the total casualties for the Frapelle operation, including the occupation of the new position the day before and the gas and HE shelling on the 17th and 18th. One officer and 18 men had been killed, 8 officers and 45 men wounded, and 100 gas casualties had been evacuated.

Concerning the initial gas attack, the Division Gas Officer estimated that between 1700 and 1030 on 17 - 18 August, 1,400 77-mm., 105-mm., and 150-mm. yellow cross rounds had fallen in Frapelle and in the two ravines, Graignoutte and Frapelle, sloping into the hollow where the town lay (Map No. 8). The troops there included elements of the 6th and 11th Infantry, Company B of the 18th MG Battalion, and the medical detachment with the 6th Infantry.

45  Rpt, Payne, Ops against Frapelle.
46  201, 6th Inf, 18 Aug (6th Div Box 20, 20.1).
47  201 56, 5th Div, 18 Aug. DOR, 18 Aug, rptd 2,150 enemy shells and said that in addition to the arty fire on Frapelle, Neuvillers had been almost totally destroyed by shell fire that morning.
   The DOR was to report 10 150-mm. diphenylchlorarsine shells falling among 180 men of Co A, 6th Inf, in Neuvillers on the evening of the 17th, causing 4 eye casualties (Rpt on Gas Atk, 19 Aug [3rd Div Box 20, 65.3]).
In that natural gas trap were a total of some 600 men, including reliefs and working parties. There was no place in the area free from high concentrations of gas, said Captain Fisher, and evacuation of the captured town was not considered. As a result, masks were worn intermittently for 30 hours before any of the troops were evacuated. All had had to take their masks off from time to time during that long period, in order to keep from fainting from intolerable discomfort or lack of air.

It was 2030 on the 18th before the first casualties were evacuated and decontamination of the gassed area was begun. Subsequent decontamination was possible only at night since the ravines and the town were open and fully exposed to enemy observation and any movement of troops brought fire down on them at once.

By 0300 on the 19th, Company C had replaced the assault company in Frepelle and Company B had relieved the unit on Hill 461. The two platoons of Company B, 18th MG Battalion, were relieved after losing 41 men, 26 of them, including 2 officers, as gas casualties. Total gas casualties evacuated by the morning of 19 August were 146, of which ten were lung cases, an unidentified number had suffered burns, and the remainder were eye cases. In an effort to hold down further casualties, said Captain Fisher, replacement of those gassed was kept to a minimum, with reduced units sent

49 Almost 1,500 men, exclusive of artillery, took part in the operation. See Analysis.

50 Hist of 18th MG Bn (8th Div Box 29, 11.4).
in to relieve the assault units.\textsuperscript{51}

In a letter to General Fries accompanying his report on the gas attack, Captain Fisher said that only 20 of the evacuated had been severely gassed, but he had ordered out of the area all suspected of being gassed even though they showed no acute symptoms. Lest further casualties occur upon exertion, "I demanded evacuation of all men whom I thought stood any chance of having been gassed."\textsuperscript{52}

A postwar account of the gas attack says that casualties were kept to a minimum owing to "ample gas proofed space" in the area, but Captain Fisher said nothing of this at the time, and the first action of the 92nd Division, on relieving the 8th Division on 23 August, was to send a platoon of engineers to gasproof the dugouts in and around Frapelle. It seems more likely that subsequent high casualties may have been averted when all men coming into the area on relief thereafter were issued Tisot masks, a special French mask without noseclip and mouthpiece that was far more comfortable to wear than the small box respirator, but was in such short supply that it was usually issued only to the artillery.\textsuperscript{53}

This is confirmed in Captain Fisher's letter of the 19th to General Fries:

\textsuperscript{51} Rpt on Gas Atk, 19 Aug (8th Div Box 20, 83.35); rpt, 1st Lt J. L. Cauthorn, Ass't DOO (Jan 1919), Particulars of Gas Attacks, n.d. (OAF-8th Div.)

\textsuperscript{52} Ltr, DOO 8th Div to G CSS, 19 Aug, subs Report on Gas Attack (OAF-8th Div).

The town is so situated that just a few shells each day will necessitate the continuous wearing of the respirator. In order to lessen the exhaustion of the men, each one who must remain in the town has been given a Tissot apparatus and a pair of gloves.

My advice in this matter is to evacuate this town in either a movement forward to the surrounding hill ahead, or backward to the hills behind the town. This of course has not been done, but the next best thing has been accomplished, the number of men in the area having been decreased by fifty percent.

This account of the gas situation in Frapelle from gas officer records is contradicted at some points by a report of Capt Frederick McCabe, 11th Infantry, who made a reconnaissance of the newly captured area on the morning of 19 August. He found labor parties wiring the line Frapelle-Lesseux, repairing the communication trenches, and constructing new shallow communication trenches. At the dressing station at Charenton, 30 gas casualties had come in between 0800 and 0200, 10 of them serious, and 6 or 8 more had been brought in after that hour. In Frapelle, he reported, the officers in the town said that several kinds of gas, in large quantities, had been fired into the area, but that the shelters in Frapelle appeared to be gas-free.

"In the extreme southwestern part I noticed the most gas... It was not strong but sufficient in quantity to affect slightly the nose and throat. I saw no gas masks worn."

54 The same advice in another form appeared earlier in the pencilled Memo on Gas Defense Measures by Lt Orr, ROO 30th FA, 6 Aug [84th Div Box 30, 53-53]; "Strict compliance with R.O. 19, 15 June, should be enforced in all organizations...."

55 Memo on conditions at Frapelle, 19 Aug [84th Div Box 11, 324].

Notes: The surname alone, which is the only identification on this report, is almost illegible but appears to be "McCabe." The only McCabe in the officer roster in the Official History was in the 11th Inf. No roster of gas personnel is extant to identify him as a gas officer.
During the next three days, 19 - 21 August, the enemy reportedly fired 5,606 rounds of gas and HE, directed principally on Frapelle, Charemont, and Chapelle St. Clair. The signal detachment in Frapelle was to say that, "after the heavy artillery fire of the enemy began, attempts to maintain wire communication with Frapelle were abandoned. The radio station was kept in operation until the relief of the division...although often put out of commission by shells." Signal casualties over the period were 1 officer and 9 men gassed. No killed or wounded were reported.56

The nearest to descriptive data on the shelling during these three days is that for the 19th, when a total of 2,300 shells were counted along the 6th Division front, with Frapelle reported to have been "under almost constant gas and H.E. from 8300 A.M. on." At 2310, said 6th Infantry G - 2, there began a "steady beat of shell fire on Frapelle" that reached a peak just before midnight when five shells per second were reported coming in. The heavy artillery fire on Frapelle, in the Ravine de Frapelle, and the Ravine de Graingoutte that day was said to have been "half gas."57

Despite the apparent volume of gas shell fire in this period, no formal reports of gas attack by the Division Gas Officer have been found, and postwar records and reports indicate that none were made. There is, however, a telegram sent by Captain Fisher to the Chief, Chemical Warfare

56 Hist of the 9th Field Signal Bn (5th Div Box 35, 11:4).
57 SOI 56, 5th Div, 16 Aug; SOI, 6th Inf, 19 Aug.
Service, at 10:30 on 22 August that reads: "Total of 3500 gas shells fell on Frapelle, Chapelle St. Clair, Ravine de Graingoutte and Ravine de Frapelle since night of 18th [i.e., 17 - 18 August]. About 3000 mustard gas, 300 phosgene and chlorpilin and 200 diphenylchlorarsine. No serious cases." 68

The records and reports of the division offer little evidence of results that might be expected from such a concentration of gas on a limited target. Division 6 - 3 reported 6th Infantry casualties of 16 men killed, 5 officers and 18 men wounded, and 3 officers and 34 men gassed between 19 and 21 August—a total of 76 casualties. (There is no operation report for 22 or 23 August.) Altogether, including the initial casualty report of 172, the division admitted to 248 casualties in the 6th Infantry as the cost of the Frapelle operation. Casualties in the other three regiments those days reportedly totaled 4 killed and 16 wounded.

The division history was to say that very few gas casualties occurred in Frapelle. Actually, the 6th Infantry and adjacent 11th Infantry suffered 300 gas casualties in the occupation of the town. How many

68

GAF-6th Div.

69

DOB, 18 - 21 Aug. On the basis of statistical section data, the Brief History, p. 3, states that almost 16 percent of the troops engaged in this first action of the division became casualties: 1 officer and 36 men killed, 21 officers and 314 men wounded, 13 men captured, with over 200 of the wounded representing gas casualties. Statistical Data Bgh, 6th Div. n.d., repeats the above figures but gives precise gas casualties of 11 officers and 176 men (6th Div Box 3, 12.3).
of these were cases of gas fright, a phenomenon much remarked on by the medical officers of the division (see Analysis) but mentioned by no one else, cannot be determined. Total gas and HE casualties for the Frapelle operation were over 400.

By 27 August, the new positions were consolidated and the Faye valley was wired and closed to the enemy. The next day the relief of the 5th Division began as elements of the 92nd Division came into the sector. On the 22nd, however, 5th Division troops were still in Frapelle and reported "some gas" falling in the town that day. Elsewhere on the long divisional front quiet prevailed. The lack of aggressiveness of the enemy was exemplified by an incident at Mere Henry (Site 661), where a brush fire swept up to the trenches and the troops climbed out of the trenches and put it out without being fired on.

On 23 August, a platoon of engineers of the 92nd Division was sent into Frapelle to gasproof the dugouts in the town. "Mustard gas was encountered in large quantities the first day, and phosgene gas on the second..."

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60 SO 534, XXXIII Corps, 17 Aug, said that between 19 - 23 Aug, the 87th Fr Div, reinforced by companies of the 92nd Div, would relieve the 8th Div. Between 24 Aug - 3 Sep, the 92nd would take over the sector. But SO 42/3, XXXIII Corps, 21 Aug, said only that the 92nd would relieve the 8th Div, making no mention of the 87th Fr Div (French Files Box 104). The 87th Div is nevertheless believed to have been in nominal command, since SD 36, 5th Div, 19 Aug, said that command of the sector would pass to the 87th Div as of 9 a.m., 25 Aug.

Notes: It is Brig Gen Rowan's recollection, as a 6th Div gas officer at the time, that units of the 87th Fr Div originally relieved the 8th Div in Frapelle, and that the first time gas shells fell on them there, they promptly evacuated the town (Interv, Brig Gen Rowan, ret., 19 Nov 57).

61 SDI 59, 22 Aug
day. The working party which remained in the town all day and might have been constantly under shell fire during the 36 hours," but reportedly suffered no casualties. 62

By the 23rd, the 6th Division was on its way to Epinal, its training in trench warfare completed. In the Arches area it was to be retrained in the tactics of open warfare, looking forward to the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations. Plans had already been made to set up a divisional gas school under the DGO, and the troops were to begin again the practice of wearing their masks a half hour each day during drill, with mask adjustment exercises each evening at retreat. 63

ANALYSIS

Concerning the Weight of Shell

In the German projector attack on 17 June, 70 gas casualties, including 2 gas deaths, occurred following the launching of 923 projector gas shells (narrative, pp. 10-11), or one casualty for each 13 shells. The statistic becomes more impressive when it is considered that these 70 casualties represented over 60 percent of the 114 men exposed to the attack.

The 5 men wounded during the gas attack (no French wounded can be distinguished as occurring then) were probably casualties of the 136 HE


Supported by HE, tear, and Sneezing gas, the enemy was to make two attempts on 2 Sep to recapture the town. Both failed and the 92nd remained in Frapelle until mid-September, when it was relieved (DOR 8, 92nd Div, 2 Sep [92nd Div Box 3, 33.1]).

63 Tng Memo 25, 15 Aug; Tng Memo 30, 24 Aug (8th Div Box 14, 50.4).
projectiles launched with the gas, and represent one casualty for each 21 HE shells.

In the Frapelle operation, 5th Division G-2 estimated that a total of 3,900 HE and gas rounds were fired by enemy batteries into the Frapelle area on the two days, 17 and 18 August. The Division Gas Officer's estimate of 1,300 mustard gas shells fired through the night of 17–18 August would appear to be a likely proportion of the total. Yet, 1,300 seems an excessive number of mustard gas shells in view of the enemy's counterattack to wrest Frapelle from the 5th Division on the night of the 18th, approximately twelve hours after completing that gas mission. Even assuming that the counterattack came a day later, on the night of the 19th, no evidence has been found that German troops counterattacked or attempted to occupy ground they had so recently contaminated with mustard gas, and particularly with that weight of mustard gas.

Other considerations cast further doubt on the estimation of 1,300 mustard gas shells. Despite some indication that there may have been a further barrage of gas and HE laid on Frapelle after the counterattack failed, Captain McCabe's reconnaissance of the captured area on the morning of 19 August (narrative, p. 34) indicates that, contrary to expectations, the town and surrounding area were largely free of dangerous concentrations of mustard gas. Under the circumstances, the DIO's estimate of 1,300 mustard gas shells may be as much in excess of probability as the estimate in June of 2,450 gas shells, where in fact a total of 923 gas projector rounds were fired.

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Division reports that Frapelle was under "almost constant gas and HE" fire all day on 19 August, with further gas shelling during the next two days, appear to be corroborated by the Division Gas Officer in his telegram on the evening of the 22nd, saying that approximately 3,000 mustard gas shells and 500 nonpersistent gas shells had been fired into the area since the night of 17 – 18 August (narrative pp. 35 - 36). Both his count and his comment that this weight of shell had caused "no serious cases," and therefore, presumably, did not justify a formal report of gas attack, seem incredible.

If anything approximating this number of shells was fired into the area, it indicated a needless, not to say prodigal, expenditure on the part of the Germans, considering the difficulties of ammunition supply in that mountain sector and the limited mission to be accomplished. By Captain Fisher's own admission, the terrain around Frapelle could be kept sufficiently contaminated to force wearing of masks with "just a few shells each day." A total of 4,300 mustard gas shells -- to say nothing of the 500 nonpersistent gas shells -- concentrated in an area a little under one square kilometer, over a period of five days, must have affected something like total saturation. It seems impossible that even with forces in the area reduced to as few as 300, all wearing Tissot masks and gloves, that "no

84 In the attack were 24 officers and 361 men from the 8th Inf; 7 officers and 145 men from Co B, 18th MG An; 3 officers and 78 men from Co A, 7th Eng; and 14 officers and 469 men from the 9th Sig En -- a total of 46 officers and 1,303 men. The medical detachment for the attack comprised 7 officers and 74 men. [Men. Med Hist of 8th Div, p. 18] (Med Dept Box 3478, Folder 1). However, the 800 says that only 800 men (including 11th Inf troops) were in the town and ravines when the first gas attack took place on the night of 17 – 18 Aug, and that the forces in the area were reduced by half on the morning of the 19th.

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serious cases" could have resulted. There is no evidence that anything approaching mustard gas saturation occurred in the Frapelle area.

In view of these circumstances, and in the absence of German records relating to the 5th Division for this period, it is suggested that the total number of mustard gas shells fired into the Frapelle area between 17 - 22 August probably did not exceed 1,800, and may have been fewer.

The Cost of Frapelle

The Official History of the Fifth Division (p. 73) repeats the statement that first appeared in the manuscript Brief History (p. 9) that, "there were very few gas casualties in Frapelle, although several men were gassed when reliefs and working parties had to pass through the deep ravines and valleys leading across what had been No Man's Land. These valleys were the only possible lines of communication and they were full of mustard gas all the time." A page later, speaking of the three days and nights of "constant artillery fire and continuous danger from gas," the history appears to contradict its first statement: "The casualties were rather severe, amounting to 16 percent of the troops engaged, besides many slight cases of gassing that were not reported to the Division Surgeon. Among officers, 35 died of wounds and 24 were wounded. Enlisted casualties were 51 killed, 4 died of wounds, 13 missing, 17 severely wounded and 216 slightly wounded. Over 150 of the wounded were gas cases, not so serious but that the men were back on duty in a week or two."

This count of the casualties at Frapelle, based on admittedly "inadequate" 5th Division records, corroborated in the Table of Casualties in the Official History (pp. 348 - 49).
The statistical section of the 8th Division reported total casualties in both the Anould and St. Die sectors up to the time of the Frapelle operation (i.e., 15 Jun - 16 Aug) as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Gassed</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jul - 16 Aug</td>
<td>4 22 6 63 3 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 23 Aug</td>
<td>1 31 13 135 11 158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>342 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were slight differences with the Official History in the statistical reports totals for the Frapelle operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Gassed</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 38 7 128 1 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still greater numbers of gas casualties were reported by the Division Surgeon, though his records covered only the period 17 - 21 August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Gassed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>21 78 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August</td>
<td>1 7 68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 August</td>
<td>8 14 91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 August</td>
<td>3 13 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>4 8 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 37 | 120 | 261 | 418 57 |

This represents only 8th Inf and its auxiliaries. Casualties in other regiments between 17 - 23 Aug are included in the total of 137.

Stat Data Rpt, 8th Div, n.d. (8th Div Box 3, 12.3).

MS. Medical History of the 8th Division, n.d., p. 19 (Med Dept Box 3475, Folder 1). The 418 casualties, said this history, represented 16.1% of the total engaged, with the wounded being 4.6% and the gassed 9.6% of the total engaged.
Disputing the Division Surgeon’s gas casualty count of 281 is the total
arrived at by an actual count of the admission lists of Field Hospital 29,
at St. Die, for the period 17 – 22 August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>11th Inf</th>
<th>6th Inf</th>
<th>16th Inf</th>
<th>MG Bn</th>
<th>Eng</th>
<th>Ya</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 August</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 August</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of the Division Gas Officer’s estimate of 1,500 gas
shells, 9 shells were necessary to achieve each of the 145 casualties he
reported (narrative pp. 30 – 35). Assuming, as this study does, a total
of 1,500 gas shells for the period 17 – 22 August, the Division Surgeon’s
record of 281 gas casualties indicates that fewer than 6 shells were re-
quired to achieve a casualty, and that the actual admissions count of
281 gas casualties, the proportion is between 4 and 5 rounds per casualty.

The source of Shipley Thomas’s total of 371 casualties for the
Frapelle operation (narrative p. 1) is not known. His figures for those
tilled, wounded, and gassed agree exactly with those reported by the 9th
Division statistical section, and the section total of 371 suggests that
Thomas misread the first digit. Thomas’s verdict was nevertheless correct.

68 Gas hospital lists (FH 29) are in Med Dept Box 3463. Almost half of
the “other” casualties were among medical corpsmen.

Notes: This total of 300 does not include 6 men of the 61st Inf
gassed in a brief bombardment at the top of the sector on 20 Aug and ad-
mitted to FH 17 at Ronchdrumpe (Med Dept Box 3461).

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to Evacuation Hospital No. 2 at Baccarat between 19 and 22 August, and many of those received on the 21st were transferred to Baccarat with the closing of Field Hospital 28 at St. Die on the 23rd. Only 80 cases are shown returned to duty between 19 and 23 August.

It is, of course, possible that the imminent relief of the division necessitated this wholesale evacuation, but that fact is nowhere suggested in a memo of the commander of the 5th Sanitary Train on 27 August.

In a recent attack 261 patients were sent to the Field Hospital as gassed cases. Over half of these were not sufficiently gassed to require their evacuation from the front line. There were several who manifested no evidence of gas poisoning when received at the Field Hospital. Many men are suffering not from gassing but from gas fright. All they need is reassurance. When working in gas-infested areas for a long time all troops may be more or less gassed. It is for the surgeon to estimate the degree of gas poisoning in each case, taking into consideration the kind of gases used, their concentration, amount of exposure, physical signs manifested by the patient and the exigency of the military situation.

The tone of this memo was distinctly unsympathetic, with its suggestion that too many troops in Frapelle had used the presence of gas to claim that they had been gassed. The memo might legitimately have made a distinction between gas fright and exhaustion cases, particularly among the early evacuees who had worn their gas masks intermittently over a period of 30 hours. It did not, nor did any medical officer who later discussed the gas casualties at Frapelle, refer to gas mask exhaustion.

A number of discussions or comments were elicited at the request of the Division Surgeon in a postwar circular letter to his unit medical officers, and the answers are revealing whether they refer to the Frapelle action or subsequent operations.

71 Memo, Lt Col C. J. Veux for all surgeons, 8th Div (Med Dept Box 5480-Memos).
The surgeon of the 6th Infantry was to say that, "gas cases were taken care of after all wounded cases had received attention. In our first engagement at Frapelle gas cases far exceeded our wounded partly owing to the fact that our orders were to evacuate all gas suspects and our lack of experience at that time in handling gas cases." Quite the contrary was the view of the 16th MG Battalion medical officer: "Gas patients were given immediate treatment and evacuated to the rear. Due to the intensive training received by the men for defense against gas the casualties were extremely light." The medical officer of the 16th MG Battalion had difficulty evaluating his experience: "Mustard gas was the only form of gas that gave any serious trouble... If it had been combined with some of the more dangerous gases, the effect would have been disastrous, as the men, had begun to think that they were immune to all forms of gas."

While the surgeon of the 11th Infantry was content to say that his regiment had had "very few casualties from gas," with slight mustard gas burns predominating, the 60th Infantry medical officer was more explicit:

There were very few genuine cases of gas poisoning. One man fell over dead after reporting to the Battalion Aid Station. I saw three typical phosgene gas cases... unconscious and frothing at the mouth and cyanotic. Two of these three subsequently died. There were a great number of men who sincerely thought that they were seriously gassed and a greater number who wished to be evacuated as gassed. All these were placed in fresh air.

72 Ltr, Surg 6th Inf to Div Surg, 5th Div, 9 Apr 19, sub: Rpt on Circ Ltr No. 6 (all these ltr rpts are in Med Dept Box 3475, Folders 9 - 13).
73 Hist, Med Det, 14th Mg Bn, 21 Apr 19.
74 Hist of Med Dept, 16th Mg Bn, n. d.
outside the aid station for a few hours and later sent back to their companies.75

Succinct but in agreement was the comment of the 61st Infantry medical officers: "Gas occasionally a friend to the weakling and an enemy to the brave. As a fatal weapon, unimportant."76

A minority report was that of the surgeon of the 20th FA. "Of special interest," he said, "it must be stated that officers and men gassed in the 20th Field Artillery were often returned to duty too soon. The majority of them had to be returned to the Hospital as they were found unfit for duties in the field."77

There is evidence that at least several of the medical officers of the 5th Division took an extremely dim view of troops who reported themselves as gassed. At the end of the war, with 1,100 gas casualties officially reported by the division, the surgeon of the 5th Military Police, for example, declared that "Gas was really of very little importance as regards real casualties." (The 6,182 wound casualties had presumably been far more real.) Gas, he said, had served principally as an excuse for malingering.78

75 Ltr, Surg 60th Inf to Div Surg, 11 Apr, subj: Med History of the War.

76 Ltr, Surg 61st Inf to Div Surg, 26 Mar, subj: Circlar Nr. 6, 21 Mar 19.

77 Memo, Surg 20th FA to Div Surg, 12 Apr, subj: Circlor Nr. 6.

78 Rpt, Surg, 5th MP, n.d. Of interest is an 18-page ann. Medical Activities Rpt, Argonne Opn, 17 May 19 (5th Div Box 8,20.1) which says that of 2,003 gas cases admitted to the 5th Div gas hospital from all sources during the Argonne battle, 628 showed slight or no symptoms when they reached the triage hospital, 30 kilometers away. Elsewhere the report says 546 were returned to duty after a short period, including 215 yperite cases, 23 diphoenene, 146 chloroptorin and yperite or diphoenene, 125 chlerarene, and 137 "malingers" (pp. 8 - 9).
The regimental surgeon of the 7th Engineers put gas cases in the same class with shell shock and PN (psychoneurotic) cases.

As far as my observation goes I consider gas to be a much exaggerated bug-a-boo, and I personally consider the ones responsible for this exaggeration. When we first arrived in the Gerardmer sector a number of men were gassed in a tunnel. I went to the hospital where these men were being treated and personally examined each one....Three had quite a severe bronchitis, four severe laryngitis, while the others were affected with eye inflammation of not a severe type. These men were kept...in bed...for some two or three weeks. After being out of bed only a few days these men were marched uphill some ten kilometers...where several of them collapsed. In my opinion any other man [whether] gassed or not would have done the same thing...At the Frapelle affair I examined carefully...each man of Company A, 7th Engineers, claiming to be gassed, found no depressant signs, and laughed each one out of his fear, evacuating not a single man and losing none that I so treated....

I positively forbade the use of the terms [shell shock or war neuroses] by either officers or men, and impressed them with the fact that it was hysteria and a disgraceful thing for the men to have.¹⁹

Although the surgeon of the Engineers says he laughed his men out of their fears, the records nevertheless show that two of the three members of the 7th Engineers evacuated as gas casualties from the dressing station at Charmont to the field hospital at St. Pie were later transferred to the hospital at Baccarat.

These comments on gas casualties are particularly pertinent to this study of the Frapelle operation, for it was an exercise in gas tolerance. The Germans, in leaving a garrison of four in the town, indicated the military importance of Frapelle, and by their prompt gassing of the town after its capture indicated their knowledge of its vulnerability.

Frapelle was a gas trap that the 5th Division elected to occupy, despite standing orders to evacuate mustard-contaminated terrain where the 75th, Regt Surg, 7th Eng to Div Surg, 1 Apr 19, sub: Cir Ltr No. 6.
military situation did not make occupation imperative. It seems clear that the staff and line officers of the division had the support of the majority of its medical officers in depreciating both the effects and effectiveness of gas. In all the records, reports, and histories of the 5th Division there is but a single suggestion that the occupation of Fargue bordered on folly. It appeared in the Division Gas Officer's advice "to evacuate this town" at once.
If the 300 gas casualties reported in this study are added to the statistical section's report of 184 killed and wounded in the Frapelle operation, the resulting total of 484 represents the more probable cost of Frapelle, still making it "a costly affair for taking so small a section of useless trench."

Medical Department Comments

Of considerable interest are the Division Surgeon's comments, following his tabulation of 261 gas casualties, that phosgene, mustard, and lachrymatory gas injuries were observed in the patients from Frapelle; that there were 10 cases of mustard gas burns, 222 cases of phosgene inhalation, and 9 cases of carbon dioxide inhalation (the other 20 were not accounted for); and finally, that all those gassed were returned to duty within one week. 69

It is difficult to accept these remarks since the reports of the Division Gas Officer speak only of mustard gas casualties, as do the after-action reports of the units in Frapelle and the divisional history. Moreover, all but 19 of the 300 cases recorded in the hospital admission lists are marked "Mustard Gas, surface contact." 77 It is further questioned whether all the gas cases were returned to duty within a week. The hospital lists reveal that almost 200 of the gas casualties received at St. Die from the dressing station at Charmont between 18 and 20 August were transferred

70 There are 3 cases diagnosed "phosgene inhalation," 7 "chlorine," and 9 "gas, undetermined."

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